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During the past two decades economists and politicians have increasingly discussed
how to sustain pay-as-you-go public pension schemes during the demographic transi-
tion that is currently taking place in the ageing societies of the developed world. As
a result, one can notice a shift from mainly pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced pension schemes
towards systems with a stronger weight on funded components for the provision of re-
tirement income. With this shift from an unfunded to a funded ﬁnancing of the social
security system, the question of risk aspects of the diﬀerent schemes has moved into
focus of the research agenda on social security. The risk components of old-age income
can be broadly classiﬁed into three categories: demographic risks, productivity (and
valuation) risks, and political risks. Here, we want to concentrate on the last type of
risk: changes of the retirement beneﬁts from the public pension program in Germany
due to changes in the speciﬁcation of the beneﬁt formula. Speciﬁcally, we address two
issues in this paper: Firstly, we calculate the“political riskiness“ of the German public
pension scheme. Secondly, we estimate how demographic developments have triggered
the changes to the beneﬁt formula.
By ”political riskiness”we mean the risk that the generosity of a pay-as-you-go pen-
sion scheme varies due to legislative changes of the beneﬁt formula. These alterations
to the beneﬁt rule obviously constitute a source of risk for the individuals life cycle
resources. McHale (2001) has pointed out this source of risk for old-age income in
a conference volume that actually focused on risk aspects of investment based social
security reforms edited by Campbell and Feldstein (2001). In order to quantify this
political risk, we construct a measure of the relative generosity of the beneﬁt formula
and track this measure for single cohorts over the time-span from 1970 to 2001. This
measure is limited since it is constructed around the standard retiree (Eckrentner) who
has paid 45 years of contributions on a gross salary that is equal to the average income
of every year. While this constitutes a very unrealistic time-path of contribution pay-
ments, this is not such a serious restriction on our measure since the time path is not
important in calculating the relative generosity of the beneﬁt rule. Also we consider
two alternative scenarios. In scenario two, which will be our benchmark, the retiree will
always make use of the possibility to retire at the earliest date possible for the regular
pension payment. The third scenario adds the assumption that the retiree has spent
seven years in higher education and is making use of the early-retirement option. This
will be the scenario with the highest volatility in relative generosity. Our measure is
based on using the beneﬁt formula as it is eﬀective in a given year and assuming that
it will not be amended from then on. Applying this principle, we calculate the gross
1social security wealth (SSW) in present value at the time of entering retirement for
each year from 1970 until 2001. The relative generosity of the pension scheme is then
deﬁned as the fraction of SSWt in each respective year t divided by the social security
wealth that would have resulted if the laws concerning the beneﬁt rule from 1970 were
still eﬀective. This measure of relative generosity will then show how the generosity of
the German public pension scheme has increased or decreased over time. We apply this
procedure to construct a time series of relative generosity for (a) single cohorts over
time (RGCbirth) and (b) for individuals who are aged 45 and 62 in each year (RGTage).
Our ﬁndings for the cohort born in 1950 are that – for the benchmark-case of early
retirement – the relative generosity of the beneﬁt formula, which is deﬁned to be unity
in 1970, will increase to 1.13 in 1972 and gradually decreases to 0.63 in 2001. In the
scenario with seven years of higher education this deterioration of relative generosity
amounts to 0.49 indicating that the generosity has been cut by 58 percent when com-
paring the current level of generosity to the zenith in 1972. For the cohorts born in
1940 and 1930, the losses in this third scenario between the highest level of generosity
in 1972 and the lowest level in 2001 amount to approximately 53 and 42 percent, re-
spectively.
The second aim of this paper is to provide an analysis on what drives the changes in
the beneﬁt formula. Speciﬁcally, we want to estimate a policy reaction function for the
relative generosity of the German pension scheme. The main focus, when estimating
this function, is how demographic developments trigger changes to the beneﬁt formula.
Similar questions have been posed by McHale (2001) and Razin et al. (2002). McHale
(2001) comes to the conclusion that a relative increase in the old-age dependency ratio
leads to a more than one-to-one relative increase in the share of old-age cash beneﬁts
to GDP. Razin et al. (2002) analyze the size of the entire welfare state and the labor
tax rate and ﬁnd that both the tax rate and the generosity of the transfer program
measured in transfers per capita decrease with the dependency ratio.
Our study is more in the line of McHale since we concentrate only on the payments
from the mandatory pension scheme (Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung). An important
deviation from both other studies is that we are not estimating an actual time-series
of transfer payments, but rather a measure of relative generosity (RGTage) that we
construct from the beneﬁt rule as legislated during the time from 1970 until 2001. This
allows us to include reforms that are only gradually phased in, and therefore are not
included in actual data yet or are not visible in the data at the time the reform is
made. Also, we do not only regress on current demographic changes, but we also test
the inﬂuence of future demographic changes.
Our results suggest that not only the current but also the future level of the old-
age dependency ratio has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the current level of generosity. An
2increase of the current old-age dependency ratio tends to raise the generosity, while
increases of the future old-age dependency ratio reduce generosity. Surprisingly, the
elasticity of the generosity to demographic changes is larger in absolute terms for the
future old-age dependency ratio than that elasticity for the current old-age dependency
ratio. Furthermore, the result of a negative generosity-elasticity of the future old-age
dependency ratio holds for both, the relative measure of generosity for the 45-year old
(RGT45) and the 62-year old (RGT62). This contradicts the result of McHale (2001)
that persons just entering retirement are protected from reductions in generosity. The
contribution rate, on the other hand, is much less inﬂuenced by demographics than the
relative generosity.
Finally, to put past changes into context of what might still be ahead of us, we apply
the method of generational accounting to assess the sustainability of the social security
system under the current valid legislation. We propose a new indicator for the mea-
surement of sustainability that calculates the size of necessary changes when reforms
are only possible in a piecemeal fashion. According to our results, reductions from the
2001-level of beneﬁts will have to be in the range from 30 to over 40 percent under this
”soft transition”-scenario. Instead, if reductions were fully implemented straight away,
the necessary cuts would amount to only roughly 20 percent.
We believe that this paper is interesting for an international audience1 for at least
two reasons: Firstly, the indicator of relative generosity that we develop is more suitable,
as we believe, to empirically address the issue of political risks within social security than
those that have been previously used. Secondly, we suppose that the non-protection
from social security reform for people close to retirement is probably not a unique
German feature. Therefore, our results could be an interesting new point of departure
for models of political economy of social security.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes and categorizes all changes
to the beneﬁt rule of the German public pension scheme since 1957. In Section 3 we
quantify these changes in terms of generosity of the pension system for speciﬁc cohorts
and scenarios. The current demographic situation and past population projections
are summarized in Section 4. In Section 5 we look at demographic developments and
changes of the beneﬁt rule. Speciﬁcally, we modify our indicator of relative generosity
such that we are able to measure changes as a time series in Section 5.1. In Section 5.2
we use this data to estimate a policy function of changes to the generosity of the public
pension scheme. To conclude this section, we turn the perspective from the past to the
future, and we quantify the sustainability of social security under the current status
quo. Section 6 concludes.
1The reader who is not interested in the German public pension scheme may want to skip Section
2, however.
32 A chronicle of the German beneﬁt formula
2.1 The history of the German Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung
Germany has been the ﬁrst country in the world to set up a public pension scheme.
The ﬁrst steps towards such a scheme were taken in 1889, when an insurance against
disability was introduced for workers. The system rapidly expanded towards a regular
pension scheme.2 However, it wasn’t until 1957 that the beneﬁts from the pension
scheme were indexed to the growth rate of labor income, and it took another twelve
years until the pension scheme became a purely pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced social security
system.3 These two features, pay-as-you-go ﬁnancing and wage-indexed earnings re-
lated beneﬁts, are the essential characteristics of what is often called a “Bismarckian”
system of public pension provision that is predominant in continental Europe.
The pension system is ﬁnanced via ﬂat rate contributions on wage income until
a certain income threshold is reached (Beitragsbemessungsgrenze). The contribution
rate has varied between 14 percent (1957-1967) and 20.3 percent (1997-1999) and is
currently at 19.5 percent. Next to the payroll contributions the state subsidizes the
public pension scheme at a level that has been in the range between one ﬁfth and one
third of total expenditures. Recent legislation – the so called “green-tax-reform” – will
most likely stabilize this level at about one third of total expenditures. This rather large
tax-ﬁnanced subsidy is commonly justiﬁed by the coverage of persons and/or pension
entitlement that should and would not be covered in an actuarially fair insurance.
Beneﬁt payments are categorized into three types of pensions: pensions due to age,
pensions due to incapability to work, and pensions for dependent survivors. In each of
these types of pensions there are still a number of diﬀerent subclasses. We will cover
some of those in the following subsections, and we give an overview of theses types in
Table 6 in the Appendix. Major reforms of the beneﬁt formula have taken place in the
years 1957, 1972, 1989 (eﬀective 1992), 1997 (planed to be eﬀective in 1999) and 2001.
2.2 The beneﬁt formula: A general description
In the remaining part of this paper, we focus only on the public pension system, the GRV
– Gesetzliche Rentenversicherung, post 1957. Even more speciﬁcally, we concentrate
2For a chronicle of the German public pension scheme from 1889 to 1957 see K¨ ohler (1990). The
history of the ﬁrst century of the public pension in Germany is extensively covered in the Festschrift
edited by Ruland (1990) and in Kohl (1990). Helpful overviews of the German public pension system
can be found in VDR (2002a), Steﬀen (2002a,b), and B¨ orsch-Supan (1999).
3Next to the introduction of the beneﬁt formula, the reform in 1957 also marked the begin of a
uniﬁed pension scheme (GRV) under which the same laws apply to the pension systems of the workers
(ArV) and the employees (AnV). The miners pension scheme (KnV) was integrated somewhat later.
Today, about 90 percent of all employed workers are covered by the GRV.
4on expenditures only, i.e. the beneﬁt formula that is used to calculate the individual
pension payments for the participants of the social security system. Here, we ﬁrst
describe the general structure of the beneﬁt formula and we will then present a more
detailed chronicle of changes to the beneﬁt formula since 1957 in subsection 2.3.
Individual pension payments are calculated with the help of the beneﬁt formula,
which is basically comprised of three components. The three components are: i) the
individual eligibility calculated by the years of contribution payments weighted by per-
sonal earnings relative to the average earnings in each respective year, ii) an adjustment
factor that is dependent on the type of pension and possible deductions for early re-
tirement, and iii) the indexation of the beneﬁts. The ﬁrst two of these components are
dependent on an individuals employment history and choice on when to retire. The
personal eligibility is also increased for years spent in education and child rearing.
Since the wage-indexed pension has been introduced in 1957, the general structure
of the beneﬁt formula has only been changed once under the so-called “Social Security
Reform Act of 1992” (RRG92).4 The formulas pre and post 1992 respectively are
shown in Table 1.5 As can be seen in row one of this table, both formulas ﬁt into the
classiﬁcation of the three components given above.
There are three diﬀerences between the two formulas, nonetheless the structure re-
mains the same. Firstly, the components V j and pV hs that relate years of coverage to
relative earnings during time of service have been joint together into one variable EP.
This step has only minor consequences since it mainly changes how credits for non-
working years that nevertheless increase eligibility are valued (especially years spent in
education). Secondly, an adjustment factor ZF is introduced in 1989 (but will only
be applied after 2000) that reduces or increases beneﬁts depending on the choice of
the retirement-age (cf. Section 2.4). And thirdly, the combination of St · AB is being
numerically transformed into values for RF and AR from a calculation that is based
on annual values into monthly values. In 1992, where both formulas yield the identical
beneﬁt payments, the AR1992 was deﬁned by St · AB1992/12 (see Table 1). The calcu-
lation of AR after 1992 is, however, fundamentally diﬀerent from the calculation of AB
until 1992 (see Table 8). At the same time the factor St was numerically transformed
into a new factor RF. The respective values for the standard retiree are 1,5 percent for
St until 1992 and unity for RF from 1992 onwards.6 The relative diﬀerence between
the diﬀerent types of pensions remains the same for St and RF. Therefore, the two
4The rules on the single components have however changed numerous times. Speciﬁcally the index-
ation of the beneﬁts has undergone three fundamental reforms and several minor changes. Compare
Section 2.3 and Table 8 in the Appendix.
5The representation of the beneﬁt formulas and their components in Tables 1 and 8 is based on
Ruland (1989) and SVR (2001,2002).
6The values of the new adjustment factor (RF) for diﬀerent types of pensions are given in Table 6
in the Appendix.
5Table 1: Beneﬁt formula for periods 1957-1992 and 1992-today








eligibility (depend. on retirement- ation
age and pension-type)
1957
V j x pV hs x St x AB =
annual monthly
-1992 beneﬁts beneﬁts
1957 45 x 100% x 1.5% x 4281 = 2,890 241 DM
1992 45 x 100% x 1.5% x 33149 = 22,376 1,865 DM
RRG92






↓ J J ^
1992
EP x ZF x RF x AR =
monthly
-today beneﬁts
1992 45 x 1 x 1 x 41.44 = 1,865 DM
2002 45 x 1 x 1 x 25.86 = 1,164 e
with V j years of coverage Versicherungsjahre
pV hs personal earnings relative to average earnings pers. Vomhundertsatz
St scaling of beneﬁts depending on type of pension Steigerungssatz
AB statistical measure of average earnings of em-
ployed during past years
allgemeine
Bemessungsgrundlage
EP years of coverage scaled by average earnings Entgeltpunkte
ZF adjustment factor for early retirement Zugangsfaktor
RF adjustment factor depending on type of pension Rentenartfaktor
AR statistical measure of value of entitlements aktueller Rentenwert
factors serve exactly the same purpose.
In Table 1 we also show the numerical calculation of beneﬁts for selective years.
The numerical values represent the so called standard retiree (Eckrentner) who has 45
years of service with the further assumption that the standard retiree has always earned
exactly the average income in every one of those 45 years during his working life. Also,
it is assumed that the standard retiree enters retirement at the regular retirement age
for pensions due to age at the age of 65. He7 will therefore receive a pension due to age
without any reductions or increases. The standard retiree will be the point of departure
for the scenarios chosen in Sections 3 and 5.
7The usage of the male gender is intentionally and necessary because other rules apply for females.
62.3 The beneﬁt formula from 1957 to 2001: A ”moving” history
As described earlier, 1957 marked the begin of the wage-indexation of the German
public pension scheme. A dynamic component was introduced by adjusting pension
payments annually to the mean growth rate of the gross average labor income of the
past years.
Since then, the beneﬁt formula or some of its components have undergone major
changes in 1972 (early retirement), 1989 (net indexation, eﬀective 1992), 1997 (de-
mographic factor, eﬀective 1999), and 2001 (modiﬁed gross indexation). We will ﬁrst
describe the major reforms chronologically and then touch on some further changes
to speciﬁc categories of the pension formula. All changes are summarized in Table 2.
Furthermore it is indicated whether the changes have increased (+) or decreased (−)
the generosity of the beneﬁt formula. The table is chronologically8 organized according
to the three major components described above: eligibility, adjustment factors9, and
indexation. Also we highlight which of these changes will be relevant for our three
scenarios used for the analysis of relative generosity later.
In 1972 the generosity of the pensions was extensively increased by allowing early
retirement for male individuals after reaching the age of 63 years if they have at least 35
years of coverage. This early retirement option was introduced without a compensat-
ing reduction of transfer payments.10 The oﬃcial term of the early retirement option
is “pensions due to age for long-term contribution-payers” (Altersrente f¨ ur langj¨ ahrige
Versicherte), which we will coin as “regular early retirement”. Along with this regular
early retirement option a wide variety of further paths into early retirement were intro-
duced. In our analysis of the relative generosity, we will nevertheless only consider the
regular early retirement option. For completeness, Section 2.4 covers the diﬀerent paths
into retirement. Finally, the 1972 reform increased the generosity of the public pension
system for low-income earners with the introduction of a minimum credit for one year
of contribution payments. Individuals with an income that was below 75 percent of the
average earnings were accredited an entitlement as if they had paid contributions on
the threshold value of 75 percent (Rente nach Mindesteinkommen: MinE).
After the expansion of the generosity of the beneﬁt formula with the reform of 1972,
the generosity has steadily been reduced in the following decades. The only exemption
from this general reduction of generosity is the introduction and expansion of beneﬁt
8Because in sections 3 and 5 we are interested in the generosity of the beneﬁt rule under the eﬀective
law at the diﬀerent points in time, the chronological order depends on the time of legislation and not
on the time of implementation.
9This column also includes further requirements for personal and general eligibility of the pension
due to incapability to work and the survivor beneﬁts.
10The pension payments were of course reduced because the retirees had two years less of contribution
payments at retirement in comparison to the pre 1972 retiree, who worked (more or less) until 65 (see
section 2.4).
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Major reform of the public pension sxstem: Introduction of gross wage indexation (partially funded until 1968)
entitlements for rearing children.11
The next truly fundamental reform was legislated in 1989 and eﬀective from 1992
onwards.12 This reform changed the general form of the beneﬁt formula (see Table
1), replaced the gross earnings indexation by a net earnings indexation (cf. Table 8),
increased the minimum age (with a long transition period) for a number of paths into
retirement (cf. Section 2.4), and introduced an adjustment factor for early retirement
(ZF). In addition, the minimum earnings rule was abrogated and coverage for years
spent in education severely reduced. The only enhancement of generosity of the RRG92
was an increase of entitlement for child-rearing (three years instead of one). As one
can see, the RRG92 was the most comprehensive reform since the introduction of the
indexed beneﬁt formula. Even today, the long-term eﬀects of this reform on the ﬁnancial
situation of the public pension scheme can hardly be captured in full detail.
In 1997, under the pension reform act of 1999 (RRG99), some paths into retirement
11Since the beginning of the 1980s politicians and scientists alike have stressed that the rules of the
pension scheme do not do justice to the true nature of a pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced pension scheme that is
in fact a three-way-generational contract, in which the working generation is supporting both the old
and the young, instead of just a two-way contract between the working population and the retirees.
See Borchert (1981), Eekhoﬀ (1985) and Sinn (1998).
12Some measures of this reform will not be eﬀective before 2018, thirty years after legislation.
8were abolished and the net-wage indexation was appended by a demographic factor
(cf. Table 8). This demographic factor was supposed to take changes to longevity into
account, but it was suspended before it came to application and was later replaced by
an entirely new indexation of the beneﬁts.
The pension reform of 2001 was, for the time being, the last reform of the German
beneﬁt formula. With this reform the indexation of beneﬁts has again been changed
fundamentally. The former net indexation (including the suspended demographic fac-
tor) is now replaced by a modiﬁed gross indexation. The dynamic factor AR is now
determined by the growth of gross earnings and by changes in the deductions for the
provision of old-age income. These deductions are deﬁned much broader than before
because they include employees and employers contributions to the GRV and in addi-
tion a ﬁxed percentage to a facultative individual account for retirement beneﬁts, the
so-called Riester-Pension.13
Turning to the changes of speciﬁc parts of the beneﬁt formula, we concentrate on
those that will be of relevance for the scenarios based on the standard retiree that will
be the center of interest in the proceeding sections.
Education
During 1957 and 1989 a maximum of 13 years of time spent for educational purposes
after the age of 16 years were accredited to personal eligibility (column 2 in Table 2). In
1989 the maximum number of years were reduced to seven and in 1996 another reform
reduced the maximum possible years to three.14 Next to the reduction of the upper
limit for the time spent in education, the valuation of educational years was also con-
tinuously decreased.15 Finally, the age after which educational credits can be obtained
was increased from 16 to 17 years of age in 1996.
Early retirement
The option for regular early retirement (column 5) was introduced in 1972. The pension
reform act of 1992 has severely deteriorated the conditions under which future gener-
13Note, that we do not include the tax subsidies of the Riester-Pension when calculating our measure
of generosity in Sections 3 and 5. The are two reasons for this: Firstly, the participation is not
mandatory and secondly, strictly speaking, this tax subsidy is not part of the public pension program,
i.e. the Sozialgesetzbuch IV. Also, if we included this subsidy of private savings program we would also
have to consider other savings subsidies and tax breaks for employer’s pension programs.
14The reductions of maximum eligible years of the RRG92 and in 1996 were only applied after a
transition period until 2004 and 2001, respectively.
15The educational credits were evaluated at the personal average earnings (pV hs) until 1965. From
1966 until 1977 lump-sum credits were given depending on the kind of education. A year of university
education was evaluated at approximately 200 percent p.a. From 1977 until 1983 all types of education
were evaluated at 100 percent p.a. From 1983 onwards years spent in education after 1965 were
evaluated at 90 percent. The RRG92 reduced the lump-sum credit to 0.75 EP.
9ations could choose this option. Retiring one year earlier than the regular retirement
age after the year 2000 reduces pensions by 3.6 percent.16 In 1997 the minimum age for
early retirement is reduced to 62 years. We evaluate this as an increase of generosity
since the deduction of 3.6 percent is still not actuarially fair (cf. Section 2.4).
Indexation
The indexation of beneﬁts has been changed numerous times during the past four
decades. The fundamental changes have already been covered above. There are how-
ever other, on ﬁrst sight minor, modiﬁcations that can have an inﬂuence on the gen-
erosity of the pension scheme. These can be classiﬁed into changes to the date of
adjustment (column 8) and the way how the past average earnings are used to calcu-
late the indexation of beneﬁts (column 9). In 1972 the adjustment-date was moved
from the 1st of January to the 1st of July. Whereas in 1978/79 the adjustment-date
was moved back to the 1st of January and in 1983 again to the 1st of July, where it has
stayed since (for the Old Laender). Changing the timing of adjustment increased the
generosity of the social security program in 1972 because pensions were increased after
six months instead of twelve. The other two times the new date of adjustment reduced
the generosity because pensions were not adjusted for eighteen months. The formula to
calculate the indexation from past average earnings has been changed numerous times
(cf. Table 8). For example in 1983, the past earnings with a lag of up to ﬁve periods
were used to calculate the dynamic component AB. One year later in 1984, the lag was
reduced to two periods. Because the growth rate ﬂuctuates quite signiﬁcantly between
years, changing the years that are considered in the formula at a given point in time
can have quiet an inﬂuence. Such changes have occurred three times and have always
led to a reduction of the adjustments of beneﬁts in the respective year of change. An
unique measure was taken in 1978, when instead of applying an adjustment formula
that is conditional on economic development, the future increases of beneﬁt payments
were ﬁxed to 4.5 percent in 1979 and 4 percent in both 1980 and 1981. Furthermore,
the pensions for existing and new retirees are no longer being diﬀerentiated by a lagged
pension adjustment for existing retirees. Because the calculation of pensions for new
pensioners was aligned to the adjustment of transfers to existing pensioners this led to
the only ever true reduction in beneﬁt payments.17
Contributions to health insurance
Finally, there has been one change to the net-value of beneﬁt payments that does not
ﬁt into any of the other categories. Starting from the 1st of July 1983, the retirees
16During the transition period between 2001 and 2006 the reductions are lower.
17The legislator tried to hide this fact, by designing a special time path of beneﬁts for persons entering
retirement in 1978.
10were obliged to pay contributions to the mandatory health insurance (column 11). The
contribution rate on gross pensions were continuously increased until 1987. Since that
time the retirees are paying half of the total contributions rate and are therefore treated
in the same manner as employees are.
2.4 Disability, incapability, unemployment and part-time work: One
thousand and one ways to retire even earlier than early
The regular retirement age in Germany has always been and still is 65 years. Never-
theless the average retirement age has ﬂuctuated within the interval between 58 and 62
years of age with the current value slightly underneath (above) 60 for men (for women).
The reason for this is that there have always been diﬀerent ways to enter retirement
other then the pensions due to age, which is the“normal”retirement type. While the ti-
tle of this subsection overstates the possibilities to enter retirement, there are currently
seven and a half18 diﬀerent ways to enter retirement without even considering survivors
beneﬁts19. These diﬀerent paths into retirement, with the respective earliest possible
age of eligibility and the necessary conditions that have to be met, are displayed in
Table 7 in the Appendix. A detailed discussion of these possibilities can be found in
Arnds and Bonin (2002). Four of these seven paths have always existed. These are
the regular pension, pension due to incapacity to work, pensions due to unemployment,
and the beneﬁts due to age for women. What we call the“regular early retirement”, the
pension due to age for long-term contribution-payers, has been introduced in 1972 along
with the pension for severely handicapped persons. The possibility to enter retirement
after part-time work only exists since the early nineties.
These numerous and generous paths into retirement have however been severely cut
down during the course of the last decade. The pensions due to age after unemployment
and part time work and the reduced retirement age for women have been abolished,
and they will not be available anymore for cohorts entering retirement in the near to far
future. There are however long transition periods under the protection of conﬁdence.
While the remaining paths into pension will oﬀer more ﬂexibility to retire early, i.e. the
regular early retirement can be chosen at the age of 62 after 2012, this ﬂexibility comes
at the cost of reductions in beneﬁts. The above mentioned ZF adjusts beneﬁt payments
by -3.6 (+6.0) percent per annum for each year of retiring earlier (later) than the regular
retirement age.20 Note that retiring early, e.g. at the age of 63 instead of 65, has
18We speak of seven and a half, since the pension due to incapacity to work actually has to be split
up in at least two cases: full incapacity and half incapacity to work, or former BU and EU pensions.
19There are another ﬁve types of survivors beneﬁts (cf. Table 6, where we have not included the
so-called Erziehungsrenten; this is a very special case for divorced survivors raising children).
20The regular retirement age will be 63 for pensions due to incapability to work or disability and 65
otherwise.
11three consequences on the ﬁnancial transactions between the individual and the pension
system. Firstly, the retiree is not paying contributions for these two years. Secondly,
the retiree is receiving his pension for two more years, and thirdly, the payment of
transfers is not only for a longer time-period but also at an earlier point in time. A fair
insurance, that is an insurance that operates at zero proﬁt under perfect competition,
would take full account of all these deviations from the stream of contribution-beneﬁt-
payments of a“regular”retiree. However during the time span of 1973 until 2000, only
the ﬁrst of the three eﬀects was considered in the beneﬁt rule of the German public
pension scheme. By legislation from 1989 the other eﬀects (receiving transfers earlier
and for a longer period) will be partially taken account for in the beneﬁt rule from
the year 2001 onwards. After 2006 beneﬁts are reduced by 0.3 percent per month
(or 3.6 percent p.a.) if pensions are paid before the 65th birthday. The ﬁrst eﬀect
(not earning further entitlements) reduces beneﬁts by roughly 2 percent to 2.5 percent
p.a.21 Retiring one year early therefore reduces the monthly pension by approximately
six percent in comparison to the pension that one would obtain if one had retired at
age 65. According to B¨ orsch-Supan (1999) the non-distorting reduction equals about
eight percent.22
To conclude this section, we illustrate how the diﬀerent pension types have been
made use of over time. In Figure 1 we depict how many percent of each male cohort
have entered retirement via the diﬀerent pension types.23 The types are sorted by the
degrees of freedom the retiree has in choosing his retirement. The top two pension
types (disability and incapability) are pensions that are (at least formally) dependent
on the medical condition of the retiree. The path over part-time work is mostly in
accordance with the employee. That over unemployment to a lesser degree, but there
is an indication that also unemployment is chosen very deliberately as a path into
retirement.24 Finally the two bottom types of pensions are those that mark the choices
of entering retirement normally, that is without any conditions on things that are not
completely in the control of the retiree.25
Figure 1 indicates that the pensions for severely handicapped persons have partially
crowded out the pensions due to incapability to work, and the pension under regular
early retirement have substantially reduced the share of people that start receiving
21In our benchmark case the reduction of beneﬁts due to working one year less at the average income
equals
1
45 ≈ 2.2 percent.
22For a more thorough, but outdated analysis see B¨ orsch-Supan (1992). For an international per-
spective on early retirement and the incentives to retire early see Gruber and Wise (1999,2001).
23In Figure 5 in the Appendix we also show at what age the diﬀerent types of pensions where entered
in 2001.
24Many employees are entering unemployment at exactly that age that will give them unabridged
unemployment beneﬁts just until the age of being eligible for pensions.
25Most people who are retiring at the regular retirement age are not retiring earlier because they do
not fulﬁll the requirement of 35 years of service.
















































Notes: Male retirees, without survivor beneﬁts.
Source: VDR (2002a).
beneﬁts at the regular retirement age for all cohorts entering retirement after 1972.
Because of the generous rules for pensions after part-time work, the share of this type
of pension has rapidly increased to over 20 percent reducing all other types of pensions.
In the following sections we will only concentrate on the generosity of the bottom
two types of pensions. This is certainly a restriction since only about one third of all
individuals are entering retirement via these two channels. We do however put up with
this loss of generality for several reasons. First and most importantly, it is close to
impossible to track all these diﬀerent types of pensions into one consistent measure of
generosity. Secondly, the qualitative changes to the generosity have followed a quite
similar path for all types of pensions except for that of pensions after part-time work.
This last exemption is therefore the most severe set-back to our approach. However,
the pension after part-time work is as much a labor-market policy and a subvention of
ﬁrms as it is a policy towards the aged.
3 The volatility of individual social security wealth: A
cohort analysis of the generosity of the beneﬁt rule
After having worked our way half-descent through the jungle of nearly 50 years of social
security laws, we can ﬁnally begin to measure the generosity of the beneﬁt rule over
13time. In order to do so, we ﬁrst describe how we construct our measure of relative
generosity of the beneﬁt rule in Germany and will then proceed to apply this indicator
to the three cohorts born in 1930, 1940, and 1950 for three diﬀerent scenarios.
All three scenarios considered are based on the standard retiree. We further assume
for all three scenarios that the person is male and single without children. The diﬀerence
between the scenarios are in concern to whether the person is making use of the early
retirement option (scenarios 2 and 3), and whether he has spent time in education
(scenario 3). Scenario 1 is hence a standard retiree who has not spent time in education
after the age of 16 and is retiring at 65. Scenario 2 diﬀers to the ﬁrst scenario in regard to
the timing of retirement: independent of the size of the adjustment factor, the person
will always choose to retire at the earliest age possible under the rules for regular
early retirement.26 Finally, under scenario 3 all assumptions of scenario 2 apply, and in
addition the person under consideration has spent seven years in education after the age
of sixteen. To ease notation, we will give names to the three scenarios: STAN, EARLY,
and EARLY ED for scenarios 1 through 3 respectively. While all three scenarios are
rather unrealistic, not all restrictions that result from these assumptions are a major
set-back for our purposes. Because we are interested in the changes to the generosity
of the beneﬁt rule over time, the assumptions only become important when they are
touched by changes to the beneﬁt rule. In subsection 3.3 we discuss the restrictions of
our approach.
Finally, before we commence with our analysis, it is helpful to stress what we are not
trying to investigate with our measure of relative generosity. For now, we are neither
interested in the sustainability of the public pension scheme, nor are we interested in
questions of intergenerational distribution. Both of these questions have already been
covered extensively: Numerous oﬃcial and unoﬃcial studies have presented projections
of the social security contribution rate addressing issues of sustainability.27 Schnabel
(1998) calculates the rates of return of the public pension system for diﬀerent cohorts,
and he ﬁnds that the returns are continuously decreasing the later a cohort is born.
Depending on the scenario under consideration, cohorts born after 1960 may actually
be facing negative rates of return.28 Finally, the method of generational accounting has
addressed both questions, sustainabilty and intergenerational distribution, at the same
time. Studies concerning the eﬀects of most recent social security reform can be found
in Bonin (2001b) and Borgmann et al. (2001). In Section 5.3 we apply the method of
26Choosing early retirement will of course reduce personal eligibility to 43 EP for the cohorts born
in 1930 and 1940 and to 42 EP for the 1950-cohort.
27See Sinn and Thum (1999) for a survey of diﬀerent contribution-rate-projections and the inﬂuence
of diﬀerent assumptions on these projections. Werding (2000) analyzes the inﬂuence of the RRG92,
the RRG99, and a preliminary version of the 2001 reform on future contribution rates.
28Eitenm¨ uller (1996) and Hain et al. (1997) conduct similar studies. In contrast to Schnabel they
compute nominal rates of return.
14generational accounting to assess the sustainability of the legal status quo of the social
security system.
3.1 A measure of relative generosity
We construct a measure of relative generosity that is based on gross social security
wealth (SSW).29 The SSW, as deﬁned in equation 1, is the sum over all beneﬁt
payments from the time of entering retirement until the expected age of death. We
adjust the nominal payments with the consumer price index, and we discount them to
a speciﬁc point in time. The SSWt in a given year t is equal to the discounted sum of
future real beneﬁt payments conditional on the policy that is valid in period t. We also
take account of transition periods and protection of trust rules by speciﬁcally applying
the policy that will be valid in a future year i as speciﬁed under the laws in t. Note
that all three components of the beneﬁt formula described above are conditional on the
policy in t and also the age of retirement may vary depending on the scenarios and the
policy in t for the cohort under consideration.
For our analysis it is important that the value of SSW does not rise only due to
moving one year closer to retirement. Therefore, we have to discount the stream of
beneﬁt payments to one speciﬁc age of the retiree instead of taking the present value
at every point in time. A natural choice for this date would be the age of entering
retirement. However, since the retirement-age varies between scenarios and cohorts,
Dc will not always be identical to R
c,s
i . Instead, we choose one discounting-year for
all scenarios of one cohort. The age that we discount to equals the earliest possible
retirement age under the considered pension types and scenarios. Because the pension
reform from 1997 allows the cohort born in 1950 to retire at the age of 62, we choose
D1950 = 1950 + 62 = 2012. In order to guarantee the comparability between the three
cohorts, we calculate the discounting date for all three cohorts by Dc = c + 62.
In order to calculate the SSW, we need to make assumptions on the future de-
velopment of parameters that determine the pension payments. In detail, we assume
that both the real growth rate and the rate of inﬂation after the year 2002 will be
at one percent per annum, respectively. We discount all pension payments by three
percent per annum. Further, we assume that the retirees share of health insurance
contributions will be constant at 7.85 percent from 2003 onwards. Also, the quota of
net-to-gross-earnings and the quota of net-to-gross-pensions (cf. Table 8) will remain
constant after 2001 at 65.4 percent and 92.4 percent respectively. The remaining life-
expectancy of the 65 year old is assumed to rise from 16 years in 2001 to 22 years in
2034. The projection of the contribution rate to the public pension system is taken
29The calculation of social security wealth has ﬁrst been introduced by Feldstein (1974).





















t gross social security wealth at time t of cohort c under scenario s
c year of birth of a speciﬁc cohort
s scenario
Dc date to which beneﬁts are discounted for cohort c
Lc
65 remaining life-expectancy conditional on reaching age 65
B
c,s
i beneﬁt payment in period i conditional on the eﬀective policy at time t
EP
c,s




i adjustment factor for diﬀerent types of pensions or reductions for early
retirement
Vi value of pension entitlement at date i (indexation)
Rc,s age of retirement of cohort c under scenario s
Pi
t policy of beneﬁt payments as legislated at date t for beneﬁt payments
in year i
CPIi consumer price index for year i
δ discount factor = 1/(1 + r), with r = real interest rate
Since we are primarily interested in the changes to the beneﬁt rule, the calculation of
the SSW is only an intermediate step in calculating our measure of relative generosity.
This measure is based on using the beneﬁt formula as it is eﬀective in a respective
year and assuming that it will remain valid from then on. Applying this principle,
we calculate the SSW at the time of entering retirement for each year from 1970 until
2002. The relative generosity of the pension scheme is then calculated by the fraction of
SSWt of each respective year t over the social security wealth that would have resulted











By constructing this cohort speciﬁc measure of relative generosity (RGC), we show how
the generosity of the German public pension scheme has increased or decreased over
time. By deﬁnition the value of RGC1970 equals one. The measure therefore shows by
how many percent the generosity of the laws at every point in time t deviates from the
generosity under the laws from 1970.
163.2 The impact of beneﬁt rule changes on relative generosity for se-
lective cohorts
We calculate our measure of relative generosity for cohorts (RGC) given in equation 2
for the three cohorts c born in 1930, 1940, and 1950. For each cohort we consider the
three earlier described scenarios s: the standard pensioner (STAN), the early retiring
standard pensioner (EARLY), and the early retiring pensioner with education (EARLY
ED). We display the results in Figure 2. Figures 2a)-c) show all three scenarios for each
respective cohort. In Figures 2d)-f) we present a single scenario for all three cohorts
in each respective sub-ﬁgure. We have chosen a logarithmic scaling of the vertical axis
in order to illustrate the size of the relative changes between years at a later point in
time.30 As expected from the qualitative analysis of changes over time, summarized in
Table 2, the generosity has increased in 1972 under all scenarios and for all cohorts, but
has steadily fallen since. One can follow the impact of the diﬀerent changes to generosity
by comparing Figure 2 with Table 2. Changes of the generosity under scenario STAN
are all due to alterations of the indexation of the beneﬁts and due to the introduction of
health care contributions (columns 8 through 11 in Table 2). The diﬀerences between
the scenarios STAN and EARLY can also be traced by focusing on the changes listed
in column 5 of Table 2: EARLY shows a sharp increase of generosity in 1972 with the
introduction of the early retirement option. For cohorts 1930 and 1940 the relative
generosity to STAN and EARLY will run in parallel paths after 1972 with EARLY
being roughly 10 percentage points above STAN. For the cohort born in 1950, scenario
EARLY will experience a sharp drop in generosity in 1989 when the adjustment factor
ZF was introduced for future early retirees.31 In scenario EARLY ED the changes to
personal eligibility due to educational years reduce the relative generosity in additions
to scenario EARLY signiﬁcantly. This large drop in generosity is not surprising since
personal entitlements due to education were reduced from 14 EP in 1970 to 2.25 EP
today under scenario 3.32
30If we did not use a logarithmic scaling later reforms could not be compared well to the laws that
were valid just before the last reform, because the changes are all in relation to the laws of 1970. The
logarithmic scaling avoids this problem since the graphical representation is in line with the period-to-
period change of the generosity.
31The 1997 increase of generosity, that allowed early retirement with deductions at 62 instead of 63,
is not very large and can hardly be seen in Figure 2c).
32Actually, we put a cap on the maximum loss by assuming only seven years of education under
scenario EARLY ED. The maximum amount of years that were accredited in 1970 was 13 years which
led to an entitlement of 26 years of contribution payments at the average salary.
17Figure 2: Relative generosity for cohorts 1930, 1940, and 1950 (RGC)
(a) Cohort 1930, all scenarios (b) Cohort 1940, all scenarios












































EARLY ED (Cohort 1930)












































EARLY ED (Cohort 1940)
(c) Cohort 1950, all scenarios (d) Scenario 1, all cohorts












































EARLY ED (Cohort 1950)













































(e) Scenario 2, all cohorts (f) Scenario 3, all cohorts























































































Cohort 1930 (EARLY ED)
Cohort 1940 (EARLY ED)
Cohort 1950 (EARLY ED)
Source: Authors calculations.
18In addition to Figure 2, we summarize the maximum and minimum levels of relative
generosity in Table 3. Obviously, the losses and the volatility of relative generosity are
largest for scenario EARLY ED. The standard retiree is the scenario with the lowest
volatility in relative generosity, even though the level of relative generosity is higher
under scenario EARLY. As can be seen from Table 3, the relative diﬀerences between
the maximum values of relative generosity in year 1972 and the lowest values in year
2001 amount to losses that vary – depending on the considered scenario and cohort –
between 32 and 57 percent. For the 1930 cohort the relative generosity has dropped
from its highest level to its lowest level 33 percent under scenario 1 and 43 percent
under scenario 3. Under scenario 2 the relative drop has only been 32 percent with a
standard deviation for RGC1930 of 0.13. For the other two cohorts under consideration,
the relative diﬀerence under scenario 2 amounts to a drop of relative generosity of 37 and
40 percent for cohorts 1940 and 1950 respectively. The highest reduction of generosity
is that of cohort 1950 under scenario 3. The standard deviation in this case is over 20
percent.
It is noteworthy that the relative losses tend to vary more between scenarios for one
cohort than between cohorts for one scenario. Also, in most cases the changes under
scenario 1 touched the relative generosity quite equally for all cohorts. Only the two
most recent major reforms of the dynamic component of the beneﬁt formula discrim-
inated between the diﬀerent cohorts (see Figure 2d). In fact, this equal treatment of
cohorts holds quite general for all changes to the indexation of the beneﬁt formula. Re-
forms of the early retirement options, especially those of the RRG92, are on the other
Table 3: Diﬀerence between maximum and minimum values of relative generosity
Cohort 1930
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Max 1.03 1.14 1.13
Min 0.69 0.78 0.61
Diﬀerence 32.7% 31.8% 45.7%
Standard deviation 12.8% 13.0% 18.0%
Cohort 1940
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Max 1.03 1.14 1.14
Min 0.64 0.70 0.54
Diﬀerence 37.4% 38.2% 52.7%
Standard deviation 13.1% 14.3% 19.8%
Cohort 1950
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Max 1.03 1.13 1.13
Min 0.62 0.63 0.48
Diﬀerence 40.0% 44.0% 57.3%
Standard deviation 13.3% 15.9% 21.1%
19hand highly discriminating in their treatment of diﬀerent cohorts.
Finally, it also comes as a surprise that among the changes to the indexation of the
beneﬁts, even seemingly minor changes to the statistical calculation of beneﬁts may
have quite a signiﬁcant impact on relative generosity. This can be seen by the rather
large reduction of relative generosity in 1977 and 1978 under scenario STAN.33
3.3 Discussion and caveats
Our analysis has shown that the relative generosity, and therefore the gross social se-
curity wealth, has been drastically reduced over the past three decades. From the way
we have constructed our measure of relative generosity, political changes of the beneﬁt
formula are the only source of risk that we consider in our analysis of the German pub-
lic pension scheme. Our results show, that the standard deviation of RGC under all
considered scenarios and for all cohorts is well over 10 percent and that the gross social
security wealth can be subject to losses between 30 and 57 percent over the life-cycle.
We will now touch on some caveats of our approach:
i) Diamond (2002, p.46) has rightfully pointed out that ”...it is not clear whether the
possibility of further legislation should be viewed as a political risk or a political hedge.
The possibility of adapting Social Security to changing economic and demographic cir-
cumstances makes it more valuable to society, not less valuable.” Still we feel that our
analysis is worthwhile for several reasons. Firstly, the magnitude of these changes is
nevertheless interesting. Secondly, we are interested in whether the elderly are gener-
ally protected from social security reform or not. Finally, we also try to identify the
inﬂuence of demographic developments on our measure of generosity (cf. Section 5).
ii) Our perspective is of course restrictive since we assume that individuals are fore-
sighted enough to include their social security wealth in the calculation of their life-cycle
resources, but are at the same naive enough to believe that the current law will still
be valid for them. There is some evidence that individuals do have quite realistic ex-
pectations on future social security reform. According to a recent survey of opinion
conducted by Boeri et al. (2001b), 75 percent of the German population are expecting
that in the course of the next 10 years there will be a reform reducing signiﬁcantly
33The 20. RAG of 1977 postponed the retirement adjustment, and it changed the calculation of
the dynamic factor AB. The lion’s share of the generosity-cut is due to the new calculation of the
AR. Because the calculation moved away from a three-year moving average towards an autoregressive
determination, a relation of the growth rates of 1974, 1975, and 1976 is a determinant in all future
calculations of AB. Because of the unusual high nominal growth rates of average earnings in these
three years, this will lead to a reduction of generosity of the beneﬁt formula if the average growth rate
during pension payment is less than 8.3 percent. In comparison, the average growth rate since 1977
has been 3.5 percent with even much lower values in the past decade.
20the level of the public pension. On the other hand, the government tends to induce
the believe amongst individuals that the current beneﬁt formula will be valid at later
times. For example, the most recent reform (AVmEG) obliges the administration of
the pension scheme to provide information of personal eligibility for current contribu-
tion payers. This information is similar to our values of SSW since it will provide the
working population with information on the prospective future size of beneﬁt payments
under current law.
iii) As stressed by Schnabel (1998) in his calculation of rates of return and touched
upon by McHale (2001) in an appendix, the expected SSW of someone facing a certain
expected remaining life-time may deviate from the SSW of someone with an uncertain
remaining life-time. This is due to the result familiar from Jensen’s inequality that the
expectation of non-linear functions evaluated at the random variable is not equal to the
function evaluated at the expectation of the random variable. McHale (2001) argues
that for the calculation of SSW there will be both a downward bias because of the
uncertainty of reaching retirement and an upward bias during pay-out if the interest
rate is larger than the growth rate. The sign of the bias is therefore undetermined. Be-
cause our measure is a relative one that has this potential bias both in the nominator
and denominator, it is highly unlikely that the simpliﬁcation of using a certain life-time
will have severe consequences. Only reforms that change the beneﬁt payments with a
non-uniform time-proﬁle for a single cohort may lead to a potential bias.
iv) Because we are only looking at the gross social security, we do not need to consider
the timing and size of contribution payments. The age-proﬁle of earnings is not im-
portant because the German public pension system does not use a sub-sample of past
earnings to calculate eligibility and because we are not analyzing the implicit rate of
return of the contributions to the scheme. A calculation of the rates of return of the
pension scheme would also have to consider the eﬀects of each reform on the future
development of the contribution rate.
v) Finally, there are restrictions due to the choice of the scenarios. By only considering
standard retirement and regular early retirement, we neglect that there are a number of
other paths into retirement and that they play a major role in the German pension sys-
tem as presented in Section 2.4. Furthermore, we are only looking at the rules for male
retirees. This is certainly a set-back, but we feel that creating even more scenarios will
not yield signiﬁcant diﬀerent results because the general direction of changes is similar
for the cases we have not considered as for those that we did consider. Nevertheless, two
restrictions apply: contrary to the scenarios we are analyzing pensions after part-time
work and individual eligibility due to time spent rearing children were both increased
21during the 1980s and 1990s. Not including entitlements for rearing children is, however,
oﬀset by the fact that women face even larger reductions in generosity then men do.
This is because the cut-back in generosity under the early retirement option has been
more severe for females. Also, we do not account for changes in the rules concerning
the beneﬁt payments to dependents.
4 Demographics and population projections
In this section we ﬁrst draw a general picture of the demographic developments in
Germany. We then touch upon past population projections, and we show how well these
projections performed at forecasting the old-age dependency ratio. We will argue that
since the late seventies the oﬃcial population projections did a good job at predicting
the old age dependency ratio at a range of roughly 15 years and that the inﬂuence of
demographic developments on social security has found its way into the political debate
since the mid-seventies. This is important for the analysis we conduct in Section 5,
where we use future values of the old-age dependency ratio as a determinant for the
generosity of the pension scheme.
4.1 Demographic developments of the past decades
In Germany, like in many other developed countries, a demographic transition towards
an ageing population is currently taking place. Today the population pyramid, whose
name originates from the silhouette of the graphical representation of the population
structure, resembles much more the contour of a mushroom than that of a pyramid.
The causes for this development can be identiﬁed in the extreme changes of the fertility
rates and in the continuously increasing life expectancy. One way to measure the
development of fertility rates is to keep track of the total fertility rate, which is the
sum of age-speciﬁc fertility rates in relation to the number of women in child-bearing
ages. A value slightly above two is needed for a constant population size. The total
fertility rates in East and West Germany have undergone a sharp increase in the late
ﬁfties of the last century and stayed at a level around 2.5 for roughly ten years. The
cohorts born during this time – generally referred to as the baby boomers – were
immediately followed by cohort-sizes that were well below the level of reproduction.
Since the beginning of the seventies the total fertility rate has stabilized at around 1.4
in West Germany, which is about 30 percent short of reproduction. Because of this
immediate succession of very high and very low birth rates, one sometimes speaks of a
”baby-boom–baby-bust“ scenario.
At the same time the life expectancy has increased over the past century at an
afore unknown speed. Except for the time span between 1960 and 1970, where the
22increases were quite moderate, life expectancy at birth has consistently increased every
ten years by approximately three years. The remaining life expectancy conditional on
reaching the age of 65 has also changed signiﬁcantly over the years. Obviously this
value is of great interest for matters concerning social security, since it is an indicator
of the duration of beneﬁt payments. This remaining life expectancy has risen by over
50 percent for men and nearly doubled for women. At the same time the probability
of reaching the age of 65 has increased from 25 percent to 80 percent for men and from
30 percent to 90 percent for women.
In order to combine the developments of the birth rate and longevity into one
indicator, we choose the old-age dependency ratio deﬁned as the proportion of the
population that is 60 years and above in relation to the 20 to 59 year old population.
This measure is especially instructive when addressing questions of pay-as-you-go public
pension schemes, since it gives an illustration of how many (potential) retirees have
to be supported by one person of the potential work force. The most recent oﬃcial
population projection forecasts roughly a doubling of this ratio within the next thirty
years (see Figure 3 below).
4.2 On the precision of past population projections
Keeping track of the size and structure of a countries population by conducting a
population census has been a common practice for over two millenniums. Using the
data collected in such a census together with mathematical models to project future
developments of the population is, compared to the over two thousand year long history
of the census, a very recent undertaking. However, enough time has gone by since
the introduction of the formal framework by Leslie (1945) that by now we have some
oﬃcial projections to look back upon and evaluate their performance at predicting
future demographic developments. In Figure 3 we plot the old-age dependency ratio
over time as predicted by various oﬃcial population projections. In addition we include
the true ﬁgures of the old-age dependency from 1970 through 2001. Inspection of this
ﬁgure shows that only the 1970 projection was really of the mark. Apparently, the
decelerated increase of life expectancy of the 1960s led to a misjudgement concerning
the future rise of life expectancy. The rise in longevity was again underestimated in the
projection of 1980, however not as severely as in 1970. Also, because birth rates were
correctly assumed to stay at the low level of the seventies, the long-run values of the
old-age dependency ratio correspond to those of the more recent projections. The 1992
projection shows how good a population projection can perform in the medium term.
From Figure 3 we conclude two things. Firstly, an idea of the extend of the popula-
tion crises has been around since the late seventies and was oﬃcially documented with









































Notes: Old-age dependency ratio at the beginning of each year is deﬁned as
60+
20−59. Except for the 8th
and 9th coordinated population projection the values are for the Old Laender.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt (1971), BMI (1984), Sommer (1992,1994,2001) and Statistical Year-
book of Germany, several years.
the population projection of 1980. Secondly, at the medium term of 15 to 20 years,
the past population projections were quite precise at predicting the level of the old-age
dependency ratio. These ﬁndings are important for our paper since we will analyze
whether political changes to the beneﬁt formula can be explained by lead values of the
old-age dependency ratio. In order to conduct this analysis, it is a prerequisite that
these projections exist, that they forecasted a “demographic crisis”, and that they are
fairly precise at the medium term.
The implications of these projections have also found early access into the political
debate on the future of the public pension scheme. Grohmann (1980) conducted a study
for the federal ministry of labor and social security where he ﬁnds that projections with
a horizon of 15 years ahead are useful for the analysis of the ﬁnancial situation of the
GRV. A federal institute for the research on demographics (BiB) was founded in 1973
as a think tank of the political implications of demographic changes. A report on the
research conducted at the BiB during the ﬁrst 25 years of its existence can be found in
H¨ ohn (1998). A comprehensive survey on the future of the public pension in an ageing
society can be found in Eekhoﬀ (1985).34
34surprisingly (or not), the diﬀerent proposed measures to reform the public pension scheme have
not much changed since then.
245 Demographic development and beneﬁt rule changes
In this section we try to estimate what are the driving forces behind changes to the
generosity of the public pension system. Speciﬁcally, we investigate how current and
future values of the old-age dependency ratios can explain the changes to the prospective
generosity of the pension scheme for a middle aged worker and the changes to the
generosity for a person who is just about to enter retirement. This analysis is in the
spirit of McHale (2001) and Razin et al. (2002). The former author analyzes how the
fraction of old-age-expenditures to GDP can be explained by the old-age dependency
ratio. A regression for the OECD countries yields the result that a relative increase
of the old-age dependency ratio increases the share of old-age-expenditures to GDP by
roughly 1.6. This elasticity is larger than unity and indicates that per-capita transfers to
the old are actually increased during demographic transition.35 McHale further gathers
data on recent reforms in the G7 countries, and he comes to the conclusion that the
currently old are protected from severe social security reforms. The middle aged are,
however, subject to cuts in generosity. He formulates a model of political economy to
explain this by introducing the fear of the middle aged that future generations might
abolish the system altogether.36
Razin et al. (2002) take a broader look at the size of the welfare state and ﬁnd
that the dependency-ratio-elasticity of social transfers equals -7.5. They put forward a
model that can explain a shrinking welfare state in an ageing economy if the median
voter is not yet part of the old population. This is due to the increased ﬁscal ”leakage”
for the median voter in an ageing society. Because of the rising share of transfers that
are paid to the elderly, the low-skilled median voter can turn from a net-beneﬁciary to a
net-contributor during demographic transition, and he will then be in favor of reducing
the welfare state.
Our analysis deviates form both of these studies for two reasons: Firstly, we are not
estimating an actual time-series of transfer payments, but rather a measure of relative
generosity that we construct from the laws of the beneﬁt formula. This allows us to
include reforms that are only gradually phased in, and that are therefore not included in
actual data yet, or are not visible in the data at the time the reform is made. Secondly,
we add the hypothesis that future values of the old-age dependency ratio may have an
inﬂuence on the generosity of the pension system.
35The inclusion of country dummies reduces this elasticity to 0.2. Unfortunately, McHale does not
comment much on this, even though this drastically changes his results. A value of 0.2 implies a severe
cut-back of per-capita-transfers instead of an increase.
36For a recent survey of the political economy of social security see Galasso and Profeta (2002).
255.1 Time-series analysis of relative generosity
In order to conduct our analysis, we ﬁrst need to modify the measure of relative gen-
erosity to be applicable over time. We do so by calculating the relative generosity over
time (RGT) for persons of a speciﬁc age at each point in time. In particular, we calcu-
late the gross social security wealth of a 45 and 62 year old under the applicable law in
t. Again, we compare this value of SSWt to the social security wealth of the respective


















In this section we are concentrating on scenario 2 only, i.e. the standard retiree
without education who is retiring early. We do so because we want to keep the number
of regressions to a limited amount. We choose scenario EARLY because we believe
this is the most representative scenario for two reasons: not only do most people who
meet the necessary requirements choose the early retirement option but also the time
path of generosity for early retirement is quite similar to that of the pension due to
occupational incapacity.
The time path of RGT45 and RGT62 is plotted in Figure 4. Because we are looking
at 45 and 62 year old persons at every point in time, we are considering a diﬀerent
set of two generations in every year. This inclusion of many cohorts in one indicator
raises the question of how we treat the rising remaining life-expectancy over time. For
the regression of the policy function, we use a constant value for the remaining life-
expectancy.37 We proceed in this manner because we want the demographic variable
to be an explaining variable and not be part of the explained variable. In Figure 4
we have, however, also included a sub-ﬁgure in which we illustrate the development of
generosity if we take account of rising life-expectancy.
The time-path of RGT45 is almost identical to that of cohort 1950 under scenario
2 (cf. Figure 2c). The time path of RGT62 diﬀers to that of RGT45 with respect to
two features. Firstly, the increase of generosity in 1972 is larger for RGT62 because the
average remaining life-expectancy we use for RGT62 is smaller than that for RGT45.
Therefore the relative increase of adding two more years of pension payments is larger.
Secondly, the time path of RGT62 exhibits a more continuous course of changes in
contrast to the discrete jumps in the time path of RGT45. The explanation for this
is that some measures are only implemented gradually. A good example is the intro-
37To be precise, for RGT
62 we have taken the average remaining life-expectancy of the 65 year old
male of all generations that are considered in this scenario. For RGT
45 we proceed in the same way.
The resulting ﬁgure is higher for RGT
45 because the sample of cohorts used to calculate this average
is born seventeen years later than in the case of RGT
62.
26Figure 4: Relative generosity for the 45 and 62 year-old (RGT) from 1970 through 2002
(a) with constant life-expectancy (b) with increasing life-expectancy
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Source: Author’s calculations
duction of health care contribution payments for retirees in 1983. Because the cohorts
entering retirement in 1984 and 1985 are also beneﬁciaries during years with a reduced
contribution rate, they are not hit by the full extend of the reform. However, as one
can see from Figure 4a) the entering retirees are by no means seriously protected from
beneﬁt rule changes.
5.2 Estimating a policy function of generosity: Does Germany have
an implicit demographic factor?
In the above mentioned survey of opinion conducted by Boeri et al. (2001b) the major-
ity of the interviewed Germans were in favor of opting out of the public pension scheme.
At the same time there was a large consensus that the size of the welfare state should
be maintained at the current level. A question that the survey does not address is the
preference of the German citizens if they have to choose between either raising contri-
butions in order to keep per-capita beneﬁts constant or reducing per-capita beneﬁts in
order to keep the contribution rates constant.38 But this is exactly the crucial question
for social security during demographic transition. In sections 3 and 5.1 we have shown
some evidence that the generosity of the pension scheme has been signiﬁcantly reduced
in the course of the past decades indicating that per-capita beneﬁts are not being held
at the constant level. We will now estimate the inﬂuence of demographic developments
on this trend.
38Consulting the web-appendix of the survey shows that the questionnaire only gave a choice of a)
reducing taxes and beneﬁts, b) increasing taxes and beneﬁts, or c) maintaining the current level of
contributions (cf. Boeri et al. (2001a)).
27We estimate a regression in which the dependent variable RGT45 is a function of the
current old-age dependency ratio, of the 17-period forecast of the old-age dependency
ratio,39 and of further variables that are indicators of the short-run ﬁnancial situation
of the GRV. These are the federal subsidy to the pension scheme as a fraction of
total expenditures, the average gross earnings of the labor income, and the reserves of
the GRV measured in monthly expenditures (SSREV). All data are taken from VDR
(2002a). We use a one period lead of the federal subsidy since the federal subsidy is
usually determined beforehand by legislation. Note that we take the natural logarithm
of the dependent and all independent variables. We estimate this function by least
squares with an included AR(1) term. The AR(1) term is added because for some
of the regressions we could not reject autocorrelation of the error terms. The same
regressions are run on RGT62. The results for the regressions are given in Table 4. We
denote signiﬁcance levels by asterisks, and we include the t-statistics in parentheses.
The results in table 4 show highly signiﬁcant coeﬃcients for both the current and
the future dependency ratios under all models. This holds for all regression on RGT45
and on RGT62. Of the other potential determinants added to the regression, only the
federal subsidy can be found to have a signiﬁcant (negative) inﬂuence on both measures
of generosity. The average earnings also have a signiﬁcant (positive) inﬂuence on the
generosity to the 62 year old. However, none of the additional determinants changes the
size or signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients of OAD and OAD(+17) in a fundamental way.
The regressions show that a 10 percent increase of the current OAD is associated with
a 6 to 7 percent increase of generosity to the middle aged. On the other hand, a future
increase of the OAD has a more than one-to-one negative inﬂuence on RGT45. The
elasticity is smaller than -1.1 in all regressions. The general direction of this result is
also valid for the generosity to the 62 year old. A rise in the current OAD is associated
with an increase in generosity, but higher levels of future old-age dependency ratios
are associated with an even larger reduction in generosity today. The coeﬃcients of
OAD are slightly higher in the regressions on RGT62 than those in the regressions on
RGT45. We also run the regressions on the contribution rate (not reported here). The
only noteworthy result of this exercise is a modest positive inﬂuence of size 0.2 of the
current OAD on the contribution rate.
The results of the regressions show that the medium to long term demographic
development has a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on how the legislator is adapting the generosity
39We use the true values of the old-age dependency ratio in the years 1970 through 2001 and the
ﬁgures from the ninth coordinated population projection for the future value of the old-age dependency
ratio. We use the true value instead of the forecast when this value is available for three reasons. First
of all, we try to avoid discrete jumps in the dependency ratio. Secondly, it is hard to say at what time
the oﬃcial population projection was known to the policy maker. And ﬁnally, Figure 3 shows that the
projections are not to far of the mark.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(OAD
a) 0.37* 0.59*** 0.64*** 0.67*** 0.65***
(1.75) (3.01) (3.13) (3.22) (3.13)
log(OAD(+17)) -1.33*** -1.17*** -1.28*** -1.28*** -1.27***
(-17.15) (-13.53) (-6.98) (-6.67) (-6.86)
log(federal subsidy(+1)) -0.33*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.34***
(-2.96) (-3.05) (-3.38) (-2.97)





dummy for uniﬁcation -0.01
(-0.22)
AR(1) 0.47** 0.38** 0.36* 0.32 0.34
(2.41) (2.05) (1.77) (1.42) (1.70)
Constant -0.93 -1.11 -1.61 -1.51 -1.62
Adjusted R
2 0.96 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.96
Durbin-Watson 1.78 1.82 1.81 1.81 1.81




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log(OAD) 0.47*** 0.68*** 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.89***
(2.99) (3.53) (5.77) (5.69) (5.89)
log(OAD(+17)) -1.12*** -0.97*** -1.28*** -1.28*** -1.29***
(15.12) (-10.94) (-9.27) (-8.77) (-9.12)
log(federal subsidy(+1)) -0.34** -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.42***
(-2.36) (-3.14) (-3.07) (-3.21)




dummy for uniﬁcation 0.01
(0.56)
AR(1) 0.49* 0.48** 0.18 0.18 0.18
(1.74) (2.16) (0.87) (0.86) (0.82)
Constant -0.58 -0.79 -2.36 -2.39 -2.35
Adjusted R
2 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Durbin-Watson 1.94 1.93 1.78 1.78 1.79
F-Statistic 215.45 230.45 212.58 170.63 172.06
t-statistics are in parentheses
signiﬁcance is denoted by asterisks (*=10%, **=5%, ***=1%)
aOld-age dependency ratio: population 60+/ population(20-59).
bReserves of the public pension scheme measured in monthly expenditures (Schwankungsreserve).
of the beneﬁt rule. This indicates that the legislator is taking action today to encounter
potential future ﬁnancial problems of the pension scheme due to demographic crisis.
29It seems that the German beneﬁt rule is subject to an implicit demographic factor.
An important result from our analysis is that future demographic developments are
eﬀecting the generosity for both future and current retirees. The ﬁndings of McHale
(2001) that current old are protected from social security reform can not be conﬁrmed
by our data. On the other hand, without long term demographic pressure the classic
theory of political economy of social security would apply: the positive coeﬃcient on
the current OAD indicates that the old will use their growing political power to increase
the generosity of the pension scheme. To our knowledge none of the existing models
of political economy of social security can explain the phenomenon that the current
OAD has a positive inﬂuence on generosity while at the same time the OAD(+17)
has a negative inﬂuence on generosity. We see this as a point of departure for future
research.
5.3 Future changes: What does it take to make the GRV sustainable?
From the projection of the future old-age dependency ratio depicted in Figure 3, it
comes as no surprise that the current level of generosity of beneﬁt payments is not
sustainable.40 Accordingly, the German government has put a task force in place – the
so-called R¨ urup Commission – that is working out a proposal for yet another reform
of the social security system.41 In the following analysis, however, we will not consider
these latest proposals. Instead, we now turn away from speciﬁc reforms, and we address
the more general question of the magnitude of further changes that will be necessary
to make the german public pension program sustainable. In order to put the past
changes to the generosity of the beneﬁt rule into context to the still to be expected
changes, we compute the sustainability – or more precisely the sustainability gap –
of the public pension scheme. We do this by applying the method of generational
accounting (c.f. Auerbach et al (1991,1992,1994), Raﬀelh¨ uschen (1999) and Bonin
(2001a)) to the isolated sector of the public pension scheme.
Because the German public pension scheme is heavily ﬁnanced by tax revenues from
the government, it is diﬃcult to conduct an isolated analysis of social security. The
federal subsidy makes up roughly 28 percent of all expenditures in the baseyear 2000.
Assumptions of how this federal subsidy will evolve over time will have an impact
on the size of the sustainability gap. We counter this problem by looking at three
40Sustainability is deﬁned as a state in which the current laws can be maintained ad inﬁnitum without
a further increase in the contribution rate or a decrease of transfers.
41This commission has suggested two measures: An increase of the statutory retirement age by two
years to 67 over the next 30 years and a modiﬁcation of the indexation of beneﬁts that will take account
of future demographic developments. The so called ”sustainability factor” is similar, but not identical
to the ”demographic factor” of the RRG 1999. The now proposed addition to the indexation-formula
will adjust the beneﬁts depending on the development of the ratio of entitled retirees to contribution
payers. This ratio is a participation-adjusted version of the old-age dependency ratio.
30Table 5: Generational accounting for the German public pension scheme









reduction 0.99years 1 −
years
100
years reduction years reduction
A)a 96% 18% 42 34% 33 33%
B)b 133% 24% 42 34% 33 33%
C)c 110% 20% 30 26.0% 25 25%
afederal subsidy is a constant fraction of beneﬁt payments
bfederal subsidy is a constant fraction of contributions
cfederal subsidy is ﬁnanced via a constant value added tax rate
scenarios: A) the fraction of expenditures that is covered by the federal subsidy will
remain constant at the level prevailing in 2000, B) the federal subsidy is a constant
fraction of contribution payments, and ﬁnally C) we assume that the federal subsidy in
the year 2000 was completely ﬁnanced by a value added tax with a tax rate of roughly
7 percent and that this tax rate will be held constant.42 Apart from computing the
sustainability gap, it is common in the generational accounting literature to calculate
indicators that show how taxes or transfers have to be adjusted in order to meet the
intertemporal budget constraint. Here, we develop a new indicator that is more in line
with the lesson we have learned from looking at the history of the beneﬁt rule above:
Reductions to the generosity of the beneﬁt rule have been gradual but continuous.
We implement this indicator of a ”soft transition” by asking the following question: If
beneﬁts were reduced by one percent every year, how many times would this reduction
have to occur in order to guarantee sustainability? The results of this exercise are given
in Table 5.
The ﬁndings conﬁrm that the GRV is currently not sustainable. Depending on
the assumption concerning the future size of the federal subsidy, the sustainability gap
ranges between 96 and 133 percent of GDP under current law. The sustainability gap
is smaller under scenario A) than it is under scenario B) because under scenario A)
the absolute size of the federal subsidy increases with the process of aging. In contrast,
under scenario B) the federal subsidy behaves as the contribution receipts do. These
tend to decrease because of the future decline in contribution payers. Scenario C) is
42Budget of the GRV for the year 2000 (ﬁgures in billion e): Contributions of the employed (141.8),
contributions of the unemployed (8.2), pensions (191.6), contributions by the public pension scheme to
health care and long term health insurance (15.8). The total of expenditures amounts to 207.4 billion
e and receipts from contributions are 150.0 billion e. We assume that the federal subsidy is equal to
the deﬁcit of 57.4 billion e. See Krimmer and Raﬀelh¨ uschen (2003) for more details and an analysis of
the entire public sector with the help of generational accounting.
31more or less neutral with respect to the demographic development.
Making the GRV sustainable at the current contribution rate would call for an
immediate decrease in beneﬁts for all generations in the region between 18 and 24
percent, again depending on the choice of scenario. Because the immediate reduction is
not a realistic indicator, we also compute a ”political feasible” path into sustainability.
Under the ”soft transition”-indicator beneﬁts are decreased annually by one percent for
all generations from the year 2001 onwards until the intertemporal budget constraint of
the public pension program is fulﬁlled with equality. We look at two diﬀerent scenarios:
under the ﬁrst (columns 4 and 5) beneﬁts are always just 99 percent of the level of
the previous year, i.e. in addition to the growth adjustment pensions are adjusted by
0.99year−2000.43 Under the second scenario beneﬁts are reduced annually by one percent
of the level that prevailed in 2000, i.e. the adjustment factor is equal to 1 −
year−2000
100 .
As can be seen from columns 5 and 7 in Table 5, the percentage reduction under both
scenarios is nearly the same. It is only the time span to reach this reduction that
diﬀers by quite a bit between these two diﬀerent transition scenarios. Finally, we can
see that there is quite a diﬀerence between the immediate reduction of beneﬁts and the
soft transition. Under scenario C) the slow reduction calls for a beneﬁt reduction by 26
percent instead of 20 percent under the immediate reduction. The necessary reductions
are even larger under scenarios A) and B) amounting to over 34 percent.44 Sensitivity
results for diﬀerent values of the growth rate (not reported here) have shown that the
”soft transition”-indicator is much less sensitive to changes of parameter values than
the other, currently used, indicators are.
Summarizing, we have shown that under a politically realistic transition path a
further continuous decrease of beneﬁts that will, at the end of the transition, amount
to a reduction of something between 26 and 34 percent is necessary to make the German
public pension program sustainable. While the results from the generational accounting
perspective are not really comparable to our measure of relative generosity, it seems
that the reductions of the past 25 years – including the reform of 2001 – have taken us
about halfway. Roughly, another 30 to 40 years of continuous bite-size reductions will
be necessary to cope with the severe demographic transition Germany is undergoing
right now.
43Because in this scenario we assume a real growth rate of one percent. This means that pension
are constant in real terms. However, because this adjustment occurs in addition to all other already
legislated reforms, a real reduction of beneﬁts cannot be ruled out completely.
44Note that under scenario A) the federal subsidy is also decreased with the reduction of beneﬁts
while under scenarios B) and C) the federal subsidy remains constant.
326 Conclusion
In this paper we analyze the political volatility of social security wealth by constructing
a measure of relative generosity of the beneﬁt rule of the German public pension system.
In order to do so, we ﬁrst need to outline the social security reforms of the past 40 years.
We have tried to put this chronicle of the beneﬁt rule into an economic structure, and as
a result we come up with a history of the beneﬁt formula of the German public pension
scheme from an economists point of view. We believe this to be a nice by-product
of our analysis since a comparable history of the German GRV can only be found in
fragments.
One of the two main issues, we address, is the uncertainty or ”political risk” of
beneﬁt payments. We show that changes to the generosity are not only very frequent,
but are also of signiﬁcant magnitude. When stressing the risk-aspects of alternative
forms of old-age income provision, such as real investments, one should keep in mind
that the pay-as-you-go ﬁnanced pension system bears several signiﬁcant risks itself. We
have only pointed out one of those risks, namely the ”political risks”.
As the second main focus, we have tried to estimate a policy function that tries
to explain legislative changes of the beneﬁt rule by current and future demographic
developments. Our ﬁndings are that a 17 year forward of the old-age dependency
ratio has a signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence on the pension scheme’s generosity to both
the middle aged and the elderly. Apparently, legislation steers towards medium-term
sustainability of the system, and it is not blind to demographic development. Even
though the demographic factor that was intended to be a part of the beneﬁt formula
under the RRG99 was never implemented, it seems as if German pensions have been
subject to an implicit demographic factor for quite some time.
Furthermore, both section 3 and 5 do not show evidence that elderly people are
protected from social security reform. On the contrary, the generosity for the elderly
is also inﬂuenced by the future development of the old-age dependency ratio. This
indicates that the burden of guaranteeing the medium-term sustainability of the system
is also carried by the currently old. We believe this phenomenon to be a point of
departure for future models of political economy of social security.
Finally, we derive the magnitude of future changes that are necessary in order to
guarantee the long-term sustainability of the GRV. If the generosity is only reduced by
annual bite-size steps, as it has been the case in the past, reductions will amount to
roughly 30 percent of the current level. Instead, if measures were taken immediately a
reduction of only 20 percent would be required.
33A Appendix: Further information on the GRV




Pension due to age
1.0
(Rente wegen Alters)
Pension due to partially reduced capacity to work
0.5
(Rente wegen teilweiser Erwerbsminderung)
Pension due to fully reduced capacity to work
1.0
(Rente wegen voller Erwerbsminderung)
Survivor beneﬁts for spouses under the age of 45 not raising children
(limited to 2 years)
0.25
(Rente wegen Todes: Kleine Witwen(r)renten)
Survivor beneﬁts for spouses older than 45 or raising children
0.55
(Rente wegen Todes: Große Witwen(r)renten)
Survivor beneﬁts for children that have lost one parent
0.1
(Rente wegen Todes: Halbwaisenrenten)
Survivor beneﬁts for children that have lost both parent
0.2
(Rente wegen Todes: Vollwaisenrenten)
Notes: Adjustment factors for pensions begining after 1.1.2001.
Source: Sozialgesetzbuch VI, 2. Kap., 2. Ab., 3. Unterab.: Rentenh¨ ohe und Rentenanpassung § 6.
Table 7: Diﬀerent paths of entering retirement and conditions that have to be met
59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67
3 years of covered work in the 
last 5 years,





Benefits due to age
(Regelaltersrente)
58
Benefits due to reduced capacity to work / occupational incapacity
(Rente wegen verminderter Erwerbsfähigkeit)
Benefits due to age after unemplyoment 
and old-age part-time employment 
(Altersrente nach Arbeitslosigkeit und Altersteilzeitarbeit)
8 years of covered work in the last 
10 years,
15 years of coverage
unemployment
Benefits due to age after unemplyoment 
and old-age part-time employment 
(Altersrente nach Arbeitslosigkeit und Altersteilzeitarbeit)
10 years of covered work after age 40, 
15 years of coverage
35 years of coverage
and severely handicapped (at least 50 percent)
Benefits due to age for women
(Altersrente für Frauen)
 Benefits due to old age for severely handicapped persons
(Altersrente für Schwerbehinderte)
8 years of covered work in the 
last 10 years,




35 years of coverage
Benefits due to age for long-term 
contribution-payers
(Altersrente für langjährig Versicherte)
5 years of coverage Benefits due to age
(Regelaltersrente)
Source: Arnds and Bonin (2002).





Name of law / reform Date of ﬁrst
adjustment:




Annual beneﬁts = Vj · pVhs · St · AB

























ABt = ABt−1 ·
BEt−1+BEt−2+BEt−3
BEt−2+BEt−3+BEt−4
1978 21. RAG 01.01.1979
Equal adjustment of pensions of new and old pension-
ers. Therefore actual reduction of pensions for new retirees.

















Monthly beneﬁts = EP · ZF · RF · AR





















1998 Gesetz zu Korrekturen in
der Sozialversicherung und
zur Sicherung der AN-
Rechte
01.07.1999 Suspension of the demographic factor DF
(for 1999 and 2000)
1999 Haushaltssanierungsgesetz 01.07.2000 ARt = ARt−1 · Inﬂationt−1
(for 2000 and initially planned for 2001)
2001 Altersverm¨ ogens-
erg¨ anzungsgesetz










with V j, pV hs, St, AB, EP, ZF, RF, AR as in table 1, and
BE average gross earnings of employees and workers Bruttoentgelte
RAS adjustment of beneﬁts that are paid to retirees who are
already retired
Rentenanpassungssatz
NQ quota of net–to-gross-earnings (including employees share
of contributions to all mandatory insurances)
Nettoquote
RQ quota of net-to-gross-pensions Rentennettoquote
DF demographic factor Demographischer Faktor
L65
t remaining life expectancy of 65 year old in year t
AV A Share of gross earnings for savings in individual accounts
(4% in 2009)
Altersvorsorgeanteil
RV B contributions to GRV (employers and employees share) Beitragssatz GRV (AN+AG)




















Pensions due to 100% 
occupational incapibility
Pension due to 50% 
occupational incapibility
Pension due to age 
after unemployment or 
part-time work




Pension due to age for 
severely handicapped 
persons
Notes: Male retirees, without survivor beneﬁts.
Source: VDR (2002b).
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